Crosshairs - Military Matters in Review Columns writted by Fred Edwards in 2007

Crosshairs - Military Matters in Review
Archive 2007

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Jan 12 2007 The turning point in Iraq -- How we got to where we are

Jan 22 2007 Two leaders with their feet to the fire -- The future of the war in Iraq is theirs

Jan 28 2007 Update on the Guard and Reserves -- Top DoD official outlines their role in the Long War

Feb 02 2007 The United States of Islam -- The Islamic extremists' timeless timetable

Feb 09 2007 Afghanistan -- The bell rings for round three -- With no knockout, expect round four

Feb 16 2007 Ground war against Iran unlikely -- But that's not the full story

Feb 23 2007 The Russian bear demands to be relevant

Mar 02 2007 The Islamic radicals aren't grinning yet -- But they are starting to smile

Mar 09 2007 Troops 3 -- Brass 0; No more business as usual

Mar 16 2007 How to dispose of the Iranian nuclear threat in 48 hours

Mar 23 2007 How al Qaeda operations are killing our troops in Iraq

Mar 30 2007 The war became more deadly for journalists and other noncombatants

Apr 06 2007 Did Iran kidnap Brits for pawns?

Apr 13 2007 Exposing the military pay gap

Apr 20 2007 Afghanistan is a better shot than Iraq - But it's another long shot because of Pakistan

Apr 27 2007 The other VA - The Secretary of Veterans Affairs speaks of a VA often ignored by the press

May 04 2007 The dog days of summer are coming early

May 11 2007 VA bonuses - What would you do?

May 18 2007 Crosshairs on trade-based money laundering

May 25 2007 Strategic Repositioning in Iraq

Jun 01 2007 Refocusing the National Guard

Jun 08 2007 Alternative fuel: Air Force leads the way -- But it can't be the leader

Jun 15 2007 Pace becomes political pawn -- What will the Senate do now?

Jun 22 2007 It's time to cure the VA disability rating system -- A committee of top experts reports ailments and cures

Jun 29 2007 What Ruchard Lugar really said -- And what he really wants

Jul 06 2007 Al Qaeda leadership is being decentralized -- But its operations continue

Jul 13 2007 Afghanistan -- Whether the United States is winning depends on the headlines

Jul 20 2007 Russia celebrates 60 years of AK-47s -- and the United States is swapping M-16s for them

Jul 27 2007 Crosshairs on Pakistan

Aug 03 2007 Tell it to the Marines

Aug 10 2007 The long war stretches beyond the horizon -- There is no peace dividend

Aug 17 2007 Vet group leaders meet 'another greatest generation' in Iraq

Aug 24 2007 Merging a 1,000-ship navy with an army of democracies

Aug 31 2007 China shoots for the highest stakes -- The anti-satellite test rings a wake-up call for the United States

Sep 14 2007 The confrontation with Iran -- What comes next?

Sep 21 2007 Pacific partnership has a hiccup

Sep 28 2007 Air Force passes its 60th year, but can it last another 60?

Oct 12, 2007 Tell it to the Marines. Better yet, give it to the Marines -- Afghanistan, that is

Oct 19 2007 What is the House trying to do to the United States?

Oct 26 2007 Cutting through the chaff -- A refreshing insight into what is happening in Iraq, and in America

Nov 02 2007 How professional military officers relate to families

Nov 09 2007 Where does patriotism begin? Are today's wars just for the military?

Nov 16 2007 Message from Fallujah, received by Fred Edwards

Dec 02 2007 Only one percent of Americans are fighting the war -- But 100 percent of this family are

Dec 28 2007 Eight reasons why the radical jihadists are rejoicing

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The turning point in Iraq

How we got to where we are

by Fred Edwards

Jan. 12, 2007 -- With the president embarked in a new phase of the war in Iraq, it's time to recap just how we got to this point.

The 9/11 attacks proved we could not withdraw into fortress America because there no longer was a fortress America. So we had to take the war to Muslim countries that supported al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

And we needed to convince the Muslim world we meant business. That would be a tough task. Why? We appeared to be weak, feckless, and terrified of casualties because of:

* The failure at Desert One in 1980 to extract 53 hostages from Teheran, Iran.

* Our pullout from Beirut after the bombing of the Marine Barracks in 1983, where 241 American service members were murdered.

* The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia after a handful of casualties in 1993.

* A decade of ineffective air action against Iraq after the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

* Spineless military responses to the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 and the attack against the USS Cole in 2000.

In addition, we were completing the assault phase of the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. We called it a victory, but much of the Islamic world saw it as simply another half-hearted, incomplete American adventure.

Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda was using Saudi money and its territory for training camps, So we had to convert the Saudi government, but we didn't want to topple the House of Saud or expand Saudi Arabian support for al Qaeda. This meant we couldn't invade Saudi Arabia, but we had to convince the Saudis we had power that we would use. We needed a way to put massive military and political pressure on the Saudis.

Moreover, to undermine the operational foundations of al Qaeda throughout the Middle East, we had to force other nations in the region to modify their behavior. For that, we needed credibility. We needed a big military victory. We needed to win a war.

We could accomplish all of this by invading Iraq, a country located strategically between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. So we started planning the invasion, and the Saudis knew of our plans.

In January, 2002, the Saudi government asked us to withdraw our troops from its land, hoping this would force us to cancel our Iraqi invasion plan. But we simply moved our forces into countries surrounding Saudi Arabia that feared Saudi power and Saudi Muslim fundamentalism -- Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. With these countries under our umbrella we gained safe staging areas and headquarters locations for the invasion of Iraq.

The Bush administration, however, could not -- or thought it could not -- give the American public the reasons I have enumerated for going to war with Iraq. So the leaders made two calamitous mistakes:

1. They mistakenly claimed that Saddam Hussein had closely collaborated with al Qaeda; and

2. They erroneously insisted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Summary

We invaded Iraq for two basic reasons.

1. It was the most strategic country in the Middle East for a base of operations from which we could move to control countries that support al Qaeda.

2. It would convert the Islamic world's contempt of the United States as a hated and impotent power to a hated but feared power. This would force countries supporting al Qaeda to change their behavior.

It was an audacious undertaking of which Americans should be proud, but it's been hobbled by more mistakes. Let's look at just three.

One, we made a mad rush to Baghdad with no after-action plan, no follow-on troops, and no recognition of the resulting insurgency until the country was heading for anarchy.

Two, we dismantled the Iraqi regular army, turning 300,000 troops out into the country with no income, no pensions, and no respect from their families and tribes.

And three, we dislocated tens of thousands of government employees, creating similar disorders, including a 40 percent unemployment rate.

Where we must go

More than 3,000 service men and service women have died to carry out this audacious plan. And tens of thousands of others will carry the scars of their sacrifices the rest of their lives. So we've invested too much precious American blood in our greatest strategic endeavor since World War II to decide that it's too difficult to complete the task. Naysayers who claim it's throwing good money after bad should think of Gen. George Washington rebuilding a broken army at Valley Forge from Dec. 19, 1777, to June 19, 1778. They should remember President Lincoln surrounded by cabinet officers who were political rivals and had little understanding of his road map to preserve the Union. And they had better think of their children and grandchildren who will face Islamic fascists in America if we don't find a way to success in Iraq.

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Two leaders with feet to the fire

The future of the war in Iraq is theirs

by Fred Edwards

Jan. 22, 2007 -- Two leaders are likely to emerge as either heroes or failures when the final chapters of the American invasion of Iraq are written.

The uppermost leader is President Bush. He elected to ignore almost every bit of advice he received from the Iraq Study Group, from his top military leaders and from most of his civilian staff. According to his statements, he concentrated solely on a theme and a question. The theme: No matter how easy it would be to bow to his advisors and thus cushion himself from criticism, he would not yank U.S. troops out of Iraq in the face of the current strategic worldwide war against radical Islamists. The question: What could he do?

The White House hallways must have been as lonely as when Richard Nixon paced through them on dark nights in late 1969, knowing that only the President of the United States was responsible to project a course to end of the Vietnam War. Those corridors had to be as lonely as when Abraham Lincoln knew that only he could make the decision that could win or lose his goal to preserve the Union. Out of the loneliness, George W. Bush came up with his decision; he would order 21,500 additional U.S. troops into Iraq and insist on a radical change in operations.

Considering the impact of his decision, just envision a statue of Robert E. Lee seated today in a place now called the Lincoln Memorial.

Well, the press has been trying to call it "Bush's war" since 2003. Now there's no question about it.

The other leader's destiny will be that of Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior U.S. military commander designee in Iraq. Petraeus is a soldier scholar. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1974 and earned the George C. Marshall Award as the top graduate from the U.S. Army Command and Staff College class of 1983. He received a Master of Public Administration degree and a PhD in international relations from Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, and completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. A former commander of the 101st Airborne Division, he's had experience in training the Iraqi forces. And he was one of the wise men who were instrumental in publishing the 2006 Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual, the first such update for the Army in 20 years.

What is Gen. Petraeus facing? David Galula, a French warrior with experience in irregular wars in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria, outlines eight Herculean steps that a counterguerrilla leader should consider, even though some, such as number 7, might require modification:

1. Destroy or expel the insurgents;

2. Deploy the static unit (the unit that will live with the people);

3. Contact and control the population;

4. Destroy the insurgent political organization;

5. Hold local elections;

6. Test the local leaders;

7. Organize a party; and

8. Vanquish the last of the guerrillas.

Galula, in his classic Counterinsurgency Warfare -- Theory and Practice, recognizes that every insurgency is different, and certainly the present bedlam in Iraq exemplifies this. Whereas a typical insurgency of Galula's experience was a movement by a group or coalition against an existing government or quasi-government, Iraq's insurgency is exponential.

For example, Thomas L. Friedman writes in the New York Times that five different insurgencies are swarming in Iraq like hornets turned loose against hornets: Sunnis against Shiites, Sunnis and Shiites against the Americans, Al-Qaeda against the United States, Shiite extremists against their fellow Shiites; and regional autocrats against any kind of democratic government in Iraq that could disturb their regimes.

So how can Petraeus handle it?

First he has to clear and hold. If the ratio of 20 combat troops per 1,000 residents given by many counterinsurgency experts is valid, it will take 120,000 troops to secure Baghdad's 6 million people -- or perhaps it's 7 million according to some estimates.

That difference of a million souls points out a major failure in classic counterinsurgency operations -- a good identification system. So he has to implement one.

Then, if he goes by the book he wrote, he will embed U.S. troops with the Iraqis and keep U.S. support battalions nearby on call. According to one report he might do exactly that, dividing Baghdad into neighborhoods, each to be policed by an Iraqi army brigade complete with U.S. embeds and a U.S. support battalion.

Since he can't do it all at once, he might begin in mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods where he has enough Iraqi-American forces to insert the needed ratio of troops to clear and hold. In theory he could then expand while the static unit of Americans and Iraqi forces remains to live with the population.

This would have to happen quickly because nobody expects the Americans to live with the "pacified" neighborhoods very long. In fact talk already exists that the "surge" will begin to unsurge by summer. That's okay, if the Iraqi security forces become stable and grow. Otherwise the eventual pullout of U.S. troops should be extended. After all, the entire concept of living with the populace is living with the populace, not visiting them as we have been doing.

Petraeus also has to overcome an obstacle to unity of command. Early accounts spoke of a partnership between the U.S. and Iraqi armies, with a commander of each at the top and commander-partners down the chain of command.

What a challenge that would be! The Americans have had enough trouble with restraints clamped on their military action by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki without adopting a system that will allow for intransigence at each level of command.

All in all, Petraeus has an enormously difficult job ahead of him. His legacy and that of the president -- indeed the future of America -- could depend upon what he does in the relatively limited window the Congress and the press are likely to allow him. Top | Home

Update on the Guard and Reserves

Top DoD official outlines their role in the Long War

by Fred Edwards

Jan. 28, 2007 -- In a far-ranging speech on Jan. 19, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas F. Hall laid out the facts on today's National Guard and Reserve forces. Here's a summary of his presentation in Florida to 120 members and guests of the Military Officers Association of America.

The Total Force

Secretary Hall said that, since 9/11, the United States has mobilized more than 550,000 guardsmen and reservists, and 86,000 of them were serving around the world while he was speaking.

He explained that the stereotypical weekend warrior no longer exists. The young men and women who used to drill one weekend a month and attend summer camp 14 days each year have transitioned to an operational reserve consisting of 46 percent of America's military strength. They have participated in the largest mobilization and produced the most combat veterans since World War II. For example, eight of the 15 combat brigades in the last rotation were National Guard brigades.

He advised that we no longer have time to train and equip the Guard and Reserves after mobilization. They and their equipment must be ready to go before being called up, and the nation must be prepared to look after their families when they are deployed.

Retention

It's at an all time high, better than before 9/11.

Morale

He recounted a visit he made to a Rest and Recuperation area where the troops go for a four-day respite from combat. He sat down with two young women and a young man who had left Iraq four hours earlier. They were authorized three beers a night, either 12 or 16 ounces, and -- guess what -- each was drinking the 16-ounce version. Hall asked how they were doing, and one of the women said, "I've had my first shower in two weeks. I haven't been shot at in four hours. And I'm having a beer. Everything is OK." That's our troops.

Draft

Hall pointed out that drafting and training recruits over and over can be tremendously expensive compared with recruiting volunteers, training them once, and then using their subsequent combat experience.

In response to recent claims that a draft will create diversity, Hall asserted that diversity already exists in the all volunteer force. Furthermore, he said that during the selective service era, draft boards used deferment tools that did not always promote diversity. He added that the troops are fighting and dying in diverse percentages.

Although statistics show the active duty forces are indeed diverse, today's Guard and Reserves represent even more diversity. Think, for example, of a bank manager, college graduate, in her mid-30s who becomes an E-6 upon activation; or a 30-year-old sheriff's deputy who dons sergeant stripes when mobilized.

Recruiting

Hall admits that Congress downsized the Army and Marine Corps too much, and needs to add 80,000 troops. This would grow the Army from 480,000 to 547,000 and the Marine Corps from 176,000 to 202,000. It also would add some 6,000 to the Guard and Reserve components. If the overall increase is limited to 7,000 or 8,000 a year, he thinks recruiters can meet those goals and the services can train the recruits.

A request for help

Hall said that members of the average brigade come from five different states, but that's only the average. For example, in Hawaii, a commander of a brigade being activated told the secretary that his 4,000 troops lived in Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, Wisconsin and 10 other places. With no centralized base, said Hall, all Americans on the home front need to look after the families of our guardsmen and reserve members while they are deployed.

The enemy

He warned that the enemy is a dedicated group that is planning another 9/11. He said they intend to come into the country to murder every American they can, including those in his audience. To exemplify their fanaticism, he referred to their willingness to strap an improvised explosive device on a baby and detonate it.

Hall concluded that Gen Abizaid (commander of U.S. Central Command) has slides that show the enemy's map for a United States of Islam, with a color-coded chart of the world and a time frame for conquest. Such are the stakes in the Long War.

He said we cannot afford to lose the conflict in the Middle East because of the consequences that would ensue. He emphasized that he was not talking about just a political goal, but the future of our country. Top | Home

The United States of Islam

The Islamic extremists' timeless timetable

by Fred Edwards

Feb. 2, 2007 -- In two recent columns I referred to a map of the Middle East -- with Mesopotamia as its core -- for which the U.S. Central Command has responsibility. I also wrote about a series of slides that show the Islamic extremists' map for a "United States of Islam," with a color-coded chart of the world and a time frame for conquest. Let's look at the genesis of these slides and then the impact of the slides themselves.

When the United States invaded Iraq, it drove an American stake into the heart of the Middle East, disrupting Islamic extremists' long-range plans to turn the region into a new caliphate. No matter what the cost, they could not allow the American infidels to remain smack in the middle of their turf. Neither could they let Iraq create a government based on any form of democracy. That would give citizens the right to rule by a law above Sharia law -- and national citizenship must be secondary or even nonexistent under Sharia. Thus Iraqi democracy of any type would separate church and state. This would be intolerable to fundamentalist extremists because to them Islam is both church and state.

So the extremists laid out their objectives. Osama bin Laden and others published goals for Muslim consumption that were readily available to all others who would care to listen. For comparison, think of Hitler's Mein Kampf, in which he outlined his plans to export Nazism throughout Europe. Then just convert Mein Kampf to "The United States of Islam." Hence the slides.

The following is my adaptation of the slides, commencing with four phases in chronological order:

First, expel America from Iraq and establish an Islamic authority in Baghdad.

Second, replace the other governments of the region with Islamic theocracies.

Third, destroy Israel and purge the Arab peninsula of Jewish and Christian influence.

And fourth, establish the historical caliphate worldwide.

If that's not breathtaking enough, read on to see how the enemy would achieve these four phases.

Phase 1. Expel America from Iraq

* Use all means of insurgency and information warfare to force the Americans to leave Iraq before the Iraqis have the capacity to provide security.

* Step up insurgent attacks against government forces and make religious claims for regime change.

* Overthrow the democratic government of Iraq and replace it with a Taliban-like regime.

* Expect the United Nations to issue a resolution, but to take no action.

* Do not fear that the United States will re-enter the conflict because the American resolve will have been battered to near non-existence.

With step one completed, the extremists would have an emirate in Iraq to serve as a base of operations from which they could revive the caliphate.

Phase 2. Replace the other governments of the region with Islamic theocracies.

* Export the message and terrorist acts through the Middle East.

* Use violence and extremist ideology to undermine the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while sweeping up Syria, Kuwait and Jordan,

* As the governments collapse, impose Taliban-like regimes in their place.

* Establish Baghdad as the capital of the caliphate.

With the completion of phase two, the revived caliphate can then turn its full attention to Israel.

Phase 3. Destroy Israel and purge the Arab peninsula of Jewish and Christian influence.

* Intensify insurgent attacks against Israel.

* Ignore any resolution by the United Nations to stand down.

* Intensify information warfare so that the caliphate gains support within the Muslim world.

* Attack Israel directly, at the expense of a nuclear exchange involving Israel, Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

The completion of phase three sets the stage for the final phase.

Phase 4. Establish the historical caliphate worldwide.

* The Baghdad caliphate will call for an uprising within the remaining Islamic states throughout the world to join the restoration.

* The remaining Islamic states will collapse from within.

At this point consider:

The world's most dangerous people would possess the world's most dangerous weapons -- nuclear, chemical, or biological. Terror attacks would weaken the world economy. Continued casualties would sap what was left of America's national resolve. Traditional allies of the United States would counsel accommodation.

If the extremists should succeed thus far, what would be the effect upon the United States? America could find itself in the terminal phase of a Clash of Civilizations similar to that described by Samuel Huntington in his book by the same title. Our economy could be driven into a recession or a depression. And internal political pressure for isolationism would be intense.

Thus the president and the Congress might sue for "Peace for our Time" (often misquoted as "Peace in our Time"), which UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced in 1938 while Adolph Hitler was executing Mein Kampf.

That's the United States of Islam as they see it.

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Afghanistan -- The bell rings for round three

With no knockout, expect round four

by Fred Edwards

Feb. 9, 2007 -- My column of Sept. 22, 2006, "Afghanistan round two -- NATO has six months before the bell," showed that round one ended when the United States and allies chased the Taliban and al Qaeda into the mountains bordering Pakistan within a month of Sept. 11, 2001.

Following that metaphor, round two began July 31, 2006, when British army Lt. Gen. David Richards took command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in southern Afghanistan. Gen. Richards said that 10 percent of the south's population supported the Taliban while 70 percent would remain "undecided" until they saw which side to stake their lives on. He set a six-month deadline to neutralize the insurgency or lose the 70 percent.

As the six months was drawing to a close, on Sun. Feb. 4, Richards turned over command of the 40,000 ISAF troops from 37 countries to U.S. Army Gen. Dan. K. McNeill.

So round three begins. Where do we stand?

The same day Gen. McNeill took command, a senior Taliban commander, Mullah Ghaffar, whose militants had overrun the Helmand Province town of Musa Qala was killed in a NATO air strike. These two events nullified a British strategy of turning over towns such as Musa Qala when local elders assured them they could maintain security. The Brits had seen it as a model for something like an ink-blot theory in reverse until the ink blot turned into an incubus.

They had signed an agreement with one Mohammed Daoud and moved out the NATO troops. But on the eve of Gen. Richards' turnover of his command, Taliban moved into Musa Qala. Within hours, NATO air apparently killed Mullah Ghaffar and 10 of his men in a convoy.

According to reports, Gen. McNeill is coming in as a hardliner who distrusted the Musa Qala deal from the time he first heard of it.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan has undergone its own surge of American troops. On Feb. 2, U.S. Maj. Gen. David M. Rodriguez took command of the U.S. troop contingent in Afghanistan from Maj. Gen. Benjamin Freakley. By that time the bulk of the 10th Mountain Division had been replaced by soldiers from the 82nd Airborne. But some 3,200 of the 10th Mountain Division's 3rd Brigade found their one-year tours extended four months.

But what about a NATO surge? Thirty-seven countries have participated in the NATO operation, which is the biggest combat effort made by that organization. But France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Turkey have continued to limit their combat role, specifically refusing to deploy troops in the volatile south, In fact, Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy is facing an anti-Afghan movement in his government that wants a deadline for withdrawing the country's 1,800 troops.

On the other hand, the Netherlands has responded to ISAF's request despite hard-line resistance from Dutch voters, while Denmark and Lithuania have agreed to add forces to Afghanistan.

The bell for the fourth round promises to clang in the spring. Taliban fighters are expected to intensify attacks, as they have every year since the Americans and allies deposed the Taliban in 2001. For their part, NATO officials are planning their own spring attack. According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the spring offensive "must be our offensive," and it must include a political campaign, an economic campaign, and a diplomatic campaign. Well, that sounds like the United States is going to embrace classical counterinsurgent techniques in earnest.

Although the forces for a military campaign fall some 15 percent short of what American and NATO officials say they need for the ground offensive, the air campaign already is underway. U.S. Air Force pilots flew 80 percent more close-air-support missions in the first five weeks of this year than during the same period last year. These missions constitute a spoiling strategy to prevent the Taliban from hunkering down and regrouping for the winter.

NATO forces point out measurable success in the third round in spite of a procession of Taliban incursions in the south. But the Taliban have promised that round four in the spring will be the bloodiest ever for what they call "foreign" troops. For example, a senior Taliban commander, Mullah Hayat Khan, said he has collected more than 2,000 suicide bombers who are ready to earn their entry into Allah's presence. He claimed he had so many volunteers that he expected difficulty in finding enough explosives and targets.

The bell is about to ring for round four.

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Ground war against Iran unlikely

But that's not the full story

by Fred Edwards

Feb. 16, 2007 -- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the American press during the week of Feb. 4 that what he wanted most in the word was peace and good will toward the United States and the rest of the West. This came on the heels of an earlier proclamation -- according to some translations -- that Israel "must be wiped off the map." And it followed his unmistakable pronouncement of late last year that Iran was "ready to take the final step to completely master nuclear energy" regardless of warnings by the United States and the United Nations.

Next, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned on Feb. 8 that any aggression against his country would be met with reciprocal strikes by Iranian forces inside and outside the country.

Then President Bush told the nation Feb. 14, "I can say with certainty that the Quds Force, a part of the Iranian government, has provided these sophisticated I.E.D.'s that have harmed our troops." He was referring to improvised explosive devices as the weapons and an elite branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as the agents that have been responsible for killing at least 170 American soldiers and wounding more than 600.

Bush capped off his statements with: "And I'd like to repeat, I do not know whether or not the Quds Force was ordered from the top echelons of the government. But my point is, what's worse, them ordering it and it happening, or them not ordering it and its happening?"

So the levels of rhetoric and saber-rattling have been ratcheted up between the United States and Iran, Iran and Israel, and Iraq and Iran. Rhetoric also is flying between the press and the Administration like Ping-Pong balls in a table tennis match.

But here are four reasons why the United States and Iran are not likely to come to blows in a conventional ground war.

1. Equipment shortfalls have neutralized our stateside troop potential.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace told the House Armed Service Committee Feb. 7 that combat units in the United States were not qualified for deployment due to equipment shortfalls. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker and Marine Corps Commandant James Conway echoed his concerns. Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, chief of the Defense Department's National Guard Bureau had earlier weighed in with similar conclusions.

2. Full activation of reserves and guard is not an option.
In the absence of combat-ready ground forces, the next source of troops would be mobilization of the Reserve and National Guard that aren't either on active duty or in the pipeline to and from activations. Unless the president can prove to the Congress and the American people that a conventional ground war against Iran is an absolute must-do, not a chance exists for general mobilization. And this brings us to the third reason it won't happen.

3. Credibility of the White House
Regardless of Iran's development of nuclear power, and in spite of Ahmadinejad's insistence of wiping Israel off the map, the administration would be hard pressed to convince the electorate or the Congress that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) such as those that were never found in Iraq are worthy of concern in Iran.

4. The Iranian position
Even with our limited capabilities to launch a second ground war in the Middle East, and even with Iran's recent weapons purchases and propagandized missile tests, Iran is in no position to stake its existence on its ability to defeat the United States.

Nevertheless, we can expect three types of military warfare against Iran -- intelligence, special ops and possible air attacks.

The intelligence war is well underway. Ahmadinejad is tossing his verbal spears while professing peaceful intentions, while Khamenei is warning of Armageddon. On the other side, Bush is "exposing" Iranian support of the insurgency in Iraq and promising the American public that he will take steps to protect our troops.

In addition, Israel's intelligence arm, the Mossad, is working overtime. Although it's unclear whether the Mossad was involved, Iranian news sources have reported that Ardeshir Hassanpour, a high-level scientist who is believed to have played a key role in Iran's nuclear program, died in mid-January under mysterious circumstances.

Furthermore, U.S. and allied special ops teams undoubtedly are applying their expertise on both sides of the border. Their mission? Find and neutralize targeted leaders, while keeping foreign fighters and weapons out of Iraq.

Finally, although it's obvious that the United States has precious few spare ground warriors to commit to an Iranian incursion, we have the most powerful airborne killing machine in the world. The secular and the religious leaders in Iran are quite aware of it.

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The Russian bear demands to be relevant

by Fred Edwards

Feb. 23, 2007 -- The United States plans to install a radar site in the Czech Republic and a ballistic rocket battery in Poland, and Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn't like it at all.

American authorities insist that the two ballistic missile defense sites will counter threats from rogue states such as Iran or North Korea. So what's the threat to Russia?

The real threat to the Russian bear is one of relevancy. The American action would flash a spotlight on weaknesses in Russia's efforts to regain the international, diplomatic respect (fear) it lost when the former Soviet Union imploded. So what can Russia do?

Putin might pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Dec. 1987. The withdrawal would authorize Putin to develop and deploy land-based short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. This would give Moscow an offensive nuclear fan of 300 to 3,400 miles. Russian officials have been hinting at such a pullout since last August. Think of a cold-war-era strike plan of hundreds of nuclear-tipped Russian missiles coming across the border. A U.S. missile defense site in Poland might pick off only a few at best. But think of the hundreds of missiles still based on the American homeland.

Russia also would benefit if the United States would negotiate a replacement treaty for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START 1, due to expire in 2009. However, American officials have shown no interest in a new treaty for two reasons. First Russia's military might has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War. And second, America's new enemies require a different set of deterrents from that needed during the Cold War.

On Feb. 10, Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his Czech counterpart, Mirek Topolanek, said their respective governments are poised to accept the American military initiative. So what's an old KGB leader like Putin to do?

On the same day, at a high-level security conference in Munich, Germany, Putin complained of NATO expansion eastward into countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union. Then he launched a verbal attack on the United States, charging that it had "overstepped its borders in all spheres," creating a dangerous "uni-polar" world filled with war and international insecurity.

So what's an old CIA leader to do? On Feb. 11, At the same security conference, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told participants that today's problems are more complex than the simpler times of the Cold War, and that nations -- including Russia -- should be partners against the threat posed by Islamic extremism.

And in a threat to Putin's relevancy, he said, "One Cold War was quite enough." Tempering his comments, Gates said, "I have, like your second speaker (Putin) yesterday, a career in the spy business. And I guess old spies have a habit of blunt speaking."

But the rhetoric has ramped up. On Feb. 19 the commander of Russia's missile forces said he could target nuclear weapons against the American sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.

In response, officials from the two Eastern European nations vowed Feb. 20 that they would not be swayed by Russia's heavy-handedness. Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg said the Russian threat would serve only to convince his countrymen that the shield is even more necessary. "We have quite an experience with Russians," he said. "You have to make clear to them you won't succumb to blackmail. Once you give in to blackmail, there's no going back." Poland's Kaczynski simply called the Russian plan "an attempt to intimidate."

Speaking for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, James Appathurai chided Putin like he was speaking to a petulant child: "The days of talk of targeting NATO territory or vice versa are long past us. This kind of extreme language is out of date and uncalled for."

But one still wonders just how far Vladimir Putin will go in his quest to make Russia appear relevant. Top | Home

The Islamic radicals aren't grinning yet

But they are starting to smile

by Fred Edwards

March 2, 2007 -- An intelligence officer often needs to see things from the perspective of the enemy. Let's try it.

The Islamic fascists have good reason to be smiling.

The propaganda war is going stupendously for them. The British are pulling 1,600 troops out of Iraq.

The United States House of Representatives is posturing in front of the world and in the faces of our troops.

The U.S. Senate has become a peevish partner of the House by complaining it will be "irrelevant" unless it behaves more dramatically than the House.

Most of the American press has wrapped itself into a crying blanket about how we've lost the war.

And the insurgents in Iraq are eating their cake and having it too. They've got Sunnis and Shiites slaughtering each other by the hundreds while blaming it all on the United States.

So they've helped the United States back itself into a political corner -- innocent Muslims die like flies if the Americans stay, and they'll die like flies if the U.S. pulls out,

Certainly the al Qaeda leaders are smiling. So how do they perceive the United States?

For one, Osama bin Laden has never expected the United States to carry through a war of attrition because America has shown him it simply can't stomach casualties. For example, Osama bin Laden told Peter Arnett in 1997 that Americans had "low spiritual morale" in comparison with that of the Russian fighters in Afghanistan, and he proved his allegations by citing our "defeats" in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden and Somalia.

Furthermore, It's doubtful that bin Laden was either shocked or awed by the American "shock and awe" campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Feb. 2003 he said he recognized America as a superpower with enormous military strength and vast economic power, but its superpower brawn rests entirely on foundations of straw. He claimed that he can bring down the entire structure by striking at only one-tenth of the foundations.

One of the most vulnerable foundations is morale.

In actions reminiscent of the Ia Drang campaign in November of 1965, Taliban leaders have advised their fighters in Afghanistan to increase the costs to Americans of doing battle in order to hasten their withdrawal. In the Ia Drang battles, the North Vietnamese used Ho Chi Minh's "cling to the belt tactics," placing themselves so close to the soldiers of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division that the Americans could not use their supporting arms.

By so doing, 12 North Vietnamese soldiers were killed for every American who died. Ho judged it a draw, which he declared a victory, because he thought the United States would not accept the continuing slaughter of its troops, even at a 12-to-1 ratio. He was right.

So the Taliban unleashed "fourth-generation warfare (4GW)," borrowing a term from Americans William Lind, Thomas Hammes and others, but used by Taliban strategist and propagandist Abu Ubeid al-Quarashi in a Feb. 2002 article.

Conventional warfare (3GW) victory arrives when one power no longer has the will or ability to continue the war. 4GW holds no distinction between war and peace as the technologically weaker jihadist extremists peck away at the superpower's popular support by America's society until the superpower simply pulls out.

It worked in Somalia and is working in Iraq. But, according to an article written for Stratfor Feb. 21, 2007 by Fred Burton, internal al Qaeda documents indicate that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan is only the first step in the movement's long-term planning. In a July 2005 letter from terrorist mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, al-Zawahiri outlined his long-term plan. Almost a mirror copy of that described in my Feb. 2, 2007 column, "The United States of Islam -- The Islamic extremists' timeless timetable," the steps are:

First, expel America from Iraq;

Second, establish a caliphate in Baghdad;

Third, replace the other governments of the region with Islamic theocracies.

And fourth, destroy Israel and all Jewish and Christian influence in the Arabian peninsula.

Using the American pullout from Vietnam as a guide, al-Zawahiri even warned al-Zarqawi that the American presence in Iraq could collapse so suddenly it would leave a void that the al Qaeda must be prepared to fill before the United Nations or other outside powers moved in.

With the ongoing actions of the U.S. Congress, truly the extremists have good reason to be smiling. Another reason springs from the expansion of their weaponry.

Example: Artillery rounds, mortar rounds and other munitions American troops captured recently that came from Iran -- either directly or indirectly.

Example: The use of chlorine in car bombs. This is poison gas but nobody is calling it a "weapon of mass destruction." So the extremists are getting away with it. What's next, "dirty (nuclear) bombs"?

Example: Our helicopters are beginning to look like ducks in a shooting gallery, with at least eight choppers knocked down in February. This doesn't bode well with an expected 400,000 flight hours expected this year in Iraq, representing a 20 percent increase over 2006.

Finally, the United States has begun its crackdown on lawlessness in Baghdad by moving small units out of the heavily fortified areas to be with the population. Most experts say this is the normal way to handle this part of 4GW warfare. But the enemy will do their best to take advantage of this in order to increase American casualties.

In spite of the smiles on the faces of the extremists, Americans also have reasons to smile. The Middle East is 4,000 years more complicated than a 1,000-word column can describe. And the complications can turn the extremists' smiles to worried frowns.

In just one example, think of the Arab countries that are terrified by the idea of the Persians (Iran) getting nuclear weaponry. The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Perhaps the biggest plus comes from two things. The militias seem to be turning against the bloodshed, and the Iraqi army and security forces are getting better and better. For example, Iraq now has more than 55,000 fully trained and equipped police officers, and Iraq's five police academies are producing more than 3,500 new officers every eight weeks.

In addition, Americans are helping Iraq build its infrastructure with 1,100 building projects ongoing, including 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations, 22 oil facilities, 93 water facilities and 69 electrical setups.

So the Islamic radicals aren't grinning just yet. And we've only begun to bring in the "surge." Let's see what happens through the early summer. Top | Home

Troops 3 - Brass 0

No more business as usual

by Fred Edwards

March 9, 2007 -- During his 11th week on the job, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates may have influenced the Army more than former secretary Donald Rumsfeld did in six years of pushing the Army toward "transformation."

It started when a Washington Post series over the weekend of Feb. 17-18 described "The Other Walter Reed." The articles spotlighted Building 18, and reported overdoses, suicide attempts and depression among Army and Marine outpatients who had been wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In response, the Army reassigned the Walter Reed Army Medical Center commander, Maj. Gen. George W. Weightman, along with a captain, two noncommissioned officers and a third enlisted member. That seemed like a reasonable move.

But then the Army installed Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley as the temporary chief. Bad move. Gen. Kiley had been commander of Walter Reed from 2002 until 2004, when he moved up to Army surgeon general. Troops and their families perceived that he not only knew the problems at the other Walter Reed, but had played them down and certainly not fixed them.

Indeed, at a meeting I attended March 3 of representatives from veterans posts in Florida, the Walter Reed problem surfaced. One delegate told the participants his wife had worked in Building 18 more than 10 years before, and she recognized the room, the mold, and the leak stains depicted in a press photo. Although the statement might or might not have been apocryphal, the perception among the veterans was reality.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates' perception certainly was reality because he announced the resignation March 2 of Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey. "I am disappointed that some in the Army have not adequately appreciated the seriousness of the situation," said Gates. "Some have shown too much defensiveness and have not shown enough focus on digging into and addressing the problems," he added.

Gen. Kiley was replaced by Maj. Gen. Eric B. Schoomaker. The 58-year-old Schoomaker comes from an assignment as commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, Md., home to biological weapon defense research. He is the younger brother of Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the retiring Army chief of staff.

I've written in previous columns about the disastrous void in infrastructure maintenance and replacement the services face as they struggle to meet budgets in order to fund the cost of the war. The disclosures about Walter Reed represent the tip of that iceberg that has been floating under the surface far too long. The 113-acre complex became a holding tank for streams of wounded soldiers, with around 650 outpatients living there or in nearby quarters. It's overwhelmed: too many patients, too few staff, and too little decent lodging,

The United States of America and the United States Army can do better than that. We can thank the Washington Post's investigative reporting for creating a catalyst for change. The Army is posting 24-hour social workers at Mologne House, which is a 200-room hotel for outpatients on the post. The Army also plans to move some outpatients to other medical centers throughout the country, and is reassessing the number of workers needed at Walter Reed.

Meanwhile soldiers are being moved out of long-neglected Building 18 so renovations can begin. It's high time our soldiers got away from the mold, the leaks and the rot.

In addition, on March 6, President Bush named two political veterans to head a commission charged with investigating the entire system of military hospitals and VA facilities. You can't get much more bipartisan than this pair -- former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, a Republican veteran wounded in World War II; and Donna Shalala, who ran the Health and Human Services Department during Bill Clinton's presidency.

The president added seven members to the panel March 9:

Marc Giammatteo, a former Army captain who has undergone more than 30 surgeries at Walter Reed;

Jose Ramos, a student at George Mason University who lost an arm in combat in Iraq;

Tammy Edwards, a research assistant at the Geneva Foundation whose husband was wounded in Iraq;

Kenneth Fisher, chairman of the Fisher House Foundation;

C. Martin Harris, chief information officer at the Cleveland Clinic;

Edward A. Eckenhoff, president of the National Rehabilitation Hospital; and

Gail R. Wilensky, a senior fellow at Project HOPE who was Medicare administrator under President George H.W. Bush

The panel has until June 30 to referee new complaints of shoddy treatment of our wounded warriors, and disturbing reports of confrontational, inequitable methods of awarding veterans' disability benefits.

The score as they enter the field: Two general officers and a chief of staff out. That makes it troops 3 -- Brass 0. Top | Home

How to dispose of the Iranian nuclear threat in 48 hours

Former senior Air Force official lays out the strategy

by Fred Edwards

March 16, 2007 -- Those who say the United States is too overextended in Iraq to counter the Iranian nuclear threat should have attended a March 6 session of the Intelligence Summit sponsored by the Intelligence and Homeland Security Educational Center. Retired Air Force Gen. Thomas G. McInerney rattled off a battle plan with machine-gun speed to some 400 participants in St. Petersburg, Fla. The following reflects the core of his comments.

First, said Gen. McInerney, within one year we should establish a deterrent strategy by bringing the Gulf crescent states into a "coalition of the willing" against nuclear terrorism. Why one year? He compared 2007 with 1938 when World War II might have been prevented. Instead of forming a coalition to stop Adolf Hitler, UK Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced Sep. 30 that year that he had secured "Peace for our Time" (often misquoted as "Peace in our Time") in an agreement with Hitler. One year after the agreement, Hitler launched World War II.

Now, compare Hitler's warning in his book, Mein Kampf, with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's signal Oct. 26, 2005: "Soon there will be a world without the United States and the Zionists." What Adolph Hitler used a book to pronounce, Ahmadinejad announced with a single sentence.

McInerney, a former Air Force assistant vice chief of staff, said we also should bring Israel into the coalition. And we should cap off the process with our own warning that, if a nuclear weapon is used against any coalition country, we will retaliate against both North Korea and Iran.

That certainly puts the two rogue regimes into the crosshairs. But what if the strategy fails?

McInerney laid out a series of timelines.

First, the Navy.

Reminding the audience that the new combatant commander at U.S. Central Command (CentCom), Adm. William Fallon, is a naval aviator, he said the United States should station three Carrier Strike Groups in the Indian Ocean.

Second, the Air Force.

CentCom could reinforce the Air Force posture in seven days. In a series of staccato statements describing friendly order-of-battle moves, he spoke of 15 B-2 stealth bombers, 32 F-17s, 32 F-22s, and the necessary support aircraft.

In addition, CentCom could redirect some of the more than 700 drones deployed in Iraq. These aircraft can observe and destroy, often without being seen.

But what of comments made by some of the media about the advisability of using nuclear weapons to "take out" Iran's nuclear facilities. McInerney spoke of a super bunker-buster bomb, powered with conventional explosives that can root out any underground facility. He added that, with the U.S. technical capability to pinpoint targets, if the first bunker buster didn't penetrate far enough, we could simply drop in a second.

Third, the Army.

Will they attack Army Lines of Communication? Gen. McInerney shrugged his shoulders, saying, "The Army is ready."

With CentCom's forces in place, the operation would accomplish the following objectives within 48 hours.

1. Neutralize the uranium development activities.

2. Eliminate or neutralize Iran's air and naval forces in order to keep the Strait of Hormuz open (the choke point between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf). This might involve 2,500 targets.

3. Neutralize its air defense system.

4. Destroy its 300 Shahab-3 missile capability.

5. Decapitate its military and political command and control system.

While this is happening, said McInerney, we should expect a simultaneous uprising against the regime. Why? Because the majority of the 78 percent of the population that are below the age of 30 do not want rule by radical Islam. They want to be governed by a system that is balanced between Islam and a secular rule of law.

"But," say the distracters, "What about the Arab Street?"

It wouldn't exist, because the coalition of the willing would be mostly Arab nations.

And if Hezbollah should attack Israel, McInerney assured the audience that Israel would defeat them. He said, "I want Hezbollah to try it."

Whether or not you agree with Gen. McInerney's take on this, it should make all Americans take note that he believes the so-called "quagmire" in Iraq has not reduced the world's only superpower to a blob of quivering jelly. Top | Home

How al Qaeda's stateside operations are killing our troops in Iraq

by Fred Edwards

March 23, 2007 -- Mohammed Atta, one of the ringleaders of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, was a used car salesman before being recruited to become a suicide pilot. Although the following about al Qaeda's smuggling ring in the United States may be a coincidence, read on to see how bizarre this used car operation would be if it wasn't true.

During a March intelligence conference in St. Petersburg, Fla., several speakers explained how al Qaeda and Hezbollah have infiltrated America's homeland. Then on March 7, John J. Loftus, the summit organizer, and Bill Warner held a keynote session titled "The Terrorists Among Us: Al Qaeda's Car Bomb Ring in America."

They explained that al Qaeda's smuggling operation actually consists of three types of vehicles: luxury cars, certain SUV models, and junkers. Al Qaeda agents ship them to their destinations through almost every major U.S. port, -- and, according to the speakers, it's happening today. Here are the details.

How to launder a luxury car.

First you get a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) from a demolished high-end vehicle in an American junkyard. Next you steal an unblemished car of the same make, model, and color. You take it to an al Qaeda lot or chop shop and transfer the VIN from the wrecked vehicle. Finally you ship it overseas as a legitimately titled vehicle.

When it arrives in, say, Saudi Arabia, it's sold as an ordinary, legal luxury car, and the profits go to al Qaeda. But is there any money in it? You bet. There's no real overhead to steal the car, so if it costs $2,000 to ship it and the vehicle sells for $40,000, al Qaeda nets $38,000. That's just one vehicle. Think of a half-dozen or more major American ports and do the math.

Why steal an SUV?

The United States has outsourced hundreds of tasks to American contractors in Iraq. The contractors typically use American SUVs for transportation, and often drive freely into American military areas. With an SUV similar to those the contractors use, terrorists can gain access long enough to kidnap an American service member.

The junker caper is a no-brainer.

Simply visit a junkyard and select cars that can be placed in running order. Get them ready in an al Qaeda lot and ship them to Iraq for use as car bombs.

So al Qaeda is essentially running a three-way turnkey operation right under our noses. But don't expect to see a bunch of Mohammed Atta look-alikes in our car lots in the future. The organization is recruiting Muslims who reflect the images of the majority of Americans -- white, black, or Hispanic. In fact, Osama Bin Laden has warned us that even Arab Muslims handling these operations will be clean-shaven and look like Westerners.

You would get a clue, however, if you should find a salesperson who doesn't want to sell you a car. That happened to one of the keynoters during their investigation.

Top | Home

The war became more deadly for journalists and other noncombatants

by Fred Edwards

March 30, 2007 -- The Islamic extremists may have developed a new weapon to use against the West. Here's why.

Before March 5, the Taliban released most journalists they abducted after confirming their legitimacy.

But not so with Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, a reporter for Italy's La Repubblica. On March 5 In southern Afghanistan, the Taliban abducted him and held him hostage for 15 days.

Kidnapped with him were his driver and his interpreter. At one point, according to Mastrogiacomo, he was forced to watch a Taliban soldier decapitate his driver. The condition of his interpreter is not clear.

Mastrogiacomo was exchanged for five Taliban prisoners, according to the Italian government and Afghan officials. Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah said one of those freed was his brother. Another freed prisoner, Ustad Yasir, identified as a Taliban spokesman, said he would return immediately to war, and was "grabbing two rifles to begin jihad again to hunt down invaders and fight nonbelievers," according to a statement attributed to him on the Internet.

Although negotiations took place between the Taliban, the Afghan government and Italian officials, top U.S. officials likely knew of them also. However it's probable that Washington made a political decision not to interfere -- even if it could -- because of an already shaky relationship with Italy. That began with an Italian hostage named Giuliana Sgrena (mentioned in the chronology that follows) who was freed in 2005. Shortly after her release, an American soldier shot at her car at a roadblock in Baghdad and killed an Italian intelligence officer.

The Mastrogiacomo incident created a furor in Washington, London and European capitals.

A spokeswoman for the British Foreign Office said the ransom sent "the wrong signal to prospective hostage takers."

The Dutch foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, came to the heart of the issue: "When we create a situation where you can buy the freedom of Taliban fighters when you catch a journalist, then in the short term there will be no journalists anymore."

U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, stated flatly, "We don't negotiate with terrorists, and we don't advise others to do so either."

The question is whether this is a one-of-a-kind operation designed to gain the release of Dadullah's brother or whether it sets the stage for more, similar kidnappings. Let's look at the chronology.

Aug. 2002. The Islamic Army in Iraq kidnapped and killed Italian journalist Enzo Baldoni. Since then, the Italian government has appeared willing to ransom Italian prisoners.

Feb. 4, 2005. Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena (mentioned above) was kidnapped in Baghdad. Freed March 4 after a settlement with her captors, Sgrena said the Italian government was obligated to do whatever it could to save a hostage's life.

This parallels statements by Italian government spokesman, Silvio Sircana, about the Mastrogiacomo abduction: "We think that the life of a person is very precious. So if there is a chance to save a life, we must do all we can do. And this was our very simple line, and not anything more."

May 2005. Clementina Cantoni, an Italian citizen working for CARE, was taken in Kabul and kept prisoner for more than three weeks before being released. Italian officials claimed their government did not pay a ransom for her release.

Oct. 2006. Photographer Gabriele Torsello was abducted and kept prisoner near Kandahar for 23 days. Her captors' first ultimatum was for Rome to pull all its troops from Afghanistan and somehow to force the United States to release the blind sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman, from captivity. That effort having failed, they eventually won a ransom. Although the Taliban claimed the kidnapping was carried out by a "criminal" group, the goals certainly sounded like they came from the Taliban.

Recently. The Taliban detained an Al Jazeera crew headed by British reporter James Bays. They released the Bays team after confirming their status. Their working for Al Jazeera could have been a factor since that organization is often seen as slanted to Muslim extremism. Nevertheless, it possible that the Taliban released Bay and company after they got their hands on Mastrogiacomo, an Italian.

Nevertheless, journalists and other non-combatants in the war zones had better start looking even more carefully over their shoulders than in the past, lest the Italian government's acquiescence to blackmail and extortion put them even further in harms way than they have been.

Top | Home

Did Iran kidnap Brits for pawns?

by Fred Edwards

April 6, 2007 -- An old saying in America about a shady political situation states that if it walks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, then it must be a duck. Let's apply the duck test to Iran's release of 15 British captives on April 3.

The seven marines and eight sailors were aboard two inflatable patrol boats in the northern Persian gulf on March 23 boarding merchant vessels when they were seized by the Iranian military. Iranian officials claimed they were trespassing in Iran's territorial waters. The British denied it, and released evidence from the Global Positioning System to support their claim.

During the ensuing two weeks, Iran not only embarrassed the British government but also used psychological intimidation against the captives. The Iranians then humiliated their captives by putting them on public display where some "confessed" and apologized for entering Iranian waters. The crowning step was when Iranian authorities released the captives after dressing them in suits and open-collared shirts similar to those that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad likes to wear.

The same day the hostages were released, an Iranian "diplomat" who had been abducted more than eight weeks earlier in Baghdad by men clad in uniforms worn by the Iraqi security forces strolled freely into the Iranian Embassy. The Iranian, Jalai Sharafi, was listed on the embassy rolls as its second secretary. He claimed to have no knowledge of his kidnappers' identity, although it is widely believed that the captors worked for the Iraqi Intelligence Service in concert with the CIA.

Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, professed that Sharafi's release had no connection with the freeing of the British captives.

Well, it walks like a duck.

Zebari also said he was continuing efforts to free five Iranians held under different circumstances by American military forces. He labeled those five, taken in January in Irbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan region, as "consular officials," although other sources identified them as Revolutionary Guards who had been training Shiite militias.

Those five were captured, along with a sixth, in a raid Jan. 11 supported by American attack helicopters and armored vehicles. A standoff occurred between the Americans and 200 Kurdish soldiers until the Kurds relented and let the Americans take their captives. The Americans released one of the six detainees the same day.

On April 4, the day after the five Brits and the Irani were released, U.S. Army Maj. Gen William B. Caldwell IV said that officials were reviewing an informal request from Teheran to allow a diplomat to visit the five captive Iranians. Signs indicate that this request will be approved.

On his part, Irani Foreign Minister Zebari said, ""We have a sense they are going to be released � "

A prisoner exchange by any other name is still a prisoner exchange.

So the situation involving the release of the British captives not only walks like a duck, but also quacks like a duck, so it passes the duck test. Top | Home

Exposing the military pay gap

by Fred Edwards

April 13, 2007 -- A recent Associated Press article titled "Military Pay Soars" painted America's service members as fat cats who are straining the military budget by being paid for their re-enlistment bonuses and special pays. That's not the full story. Here's why.

Data prepared by the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) provide the yo-yo history of military pay since the all-volunteer force began. From the get go during the 1970s Congress capped military basic pay raises until it was unpleasantly surprised to find troops voting with their feet; retention was plummeting. The lawmakers discovered that men and women join the all-volunteer services and remain for many reasons, but one of them is inescapable -- pay.

So Congress enacted double-digit pay raises in 1981 and 1982, and retention recovered. Then, for 12 of the next 16 years Congress, in league with several administrations, again capped military pay raises below raises in the private sector.

By 1999 the cumulative shortfall between military pay and salaries in the civilian sector had reached 13.5 percent, and the troops again were marching off to civilian jobs at double-time. Once again the phenomenon caught the attention of the lawmakers, and they applied a reasonable fix to the problem. For each of the next eight years they would raise military pay at least 0.5 percent above that of the private sector. That reduced the pay gap to 4.0 percent.

The eight years ended, the fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act set a 2.2 percent pay raise, along with another 0.5 percent in targeted increases. Sounds good on the surface, except -- as MOAA points out -- it was the lowest military pay raise in 13 years. To compound the problem, the administration's fiscal 2008 budget calls for only a 3.0 percent raise that, for the first time in eight years, would leave the pay gap foundering by the wayside.

MOAA is calling for the legislators to enact a pay raise of at least 3.5 percent (the Employment Cost Index plus 0.5 percent) for fiscal year 2008 to get the troops back on the catch-up path.

But if the troops are getting big bonuses, why do they need basic pay raises?

The AP article reports that almost all service members deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait receive a maximum of $15,000 for re-enlisting. On a six-year basis, that amounts to $2,500 a year, or $208 per month. Not a princely sum for a middle-grade noncommissioned officer who seems to be spending more time in a combat zone than at home.

More important, the basic pay disparity creates a long-term recruiting and retention issue. Service members earn their retired pay as a percentage of their basic pay -- not their bonuses. As basic pay lags, so goes retirement pay, and that's the rub.

Now what about the assertion that the military budget is strained to pay for the troops?

That's exactly true, but not the way it might seem.

MOAA's figures show why the budget is strained. Today's wartime defense budget is only 4.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. That's one-third lower than the average during all the peace-time years since WWII. And compare it to other wars. According to the Defense Department, annual defense expenditures during World War II were 38.0 percent, for the Korean War, 14.0 percent, and during the Vietnam War, 9.5 percent.

So the solution to this should be a no-brainer. If the budget is strained, increase it. After all, there's a war on. Top | Home

Afghanistan is a better bet than Iraq

But it's another long shot because of Pakistan

by Fred Edwards

April 20, 2007 -- "We must, we must win in Afghanistan," said terrorism expert Richard Miniter at an intelligence conference in St. Petersburg, Fla., in March. And retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey says it's possible. But he adds that 2007 is the crucial year. A Washington Post article of April 10 quotes him as saying, "We are now in a race against time."

Although McCaffrey and Miniter agree on most steps to take, they differ on the opium problem. McCaffrey, who visited Afghanistan in February, calls the country a narco-state with an opium/heroin income of $3.1 billion. He says the United States must conduct a sustained drive against the drug operations or it will fail.

Miniter, on the other hand, says the United States can't stop the drug trade entirely because doing so would undermine financial support of friendly warlords. Other experts have argued that you can't really tell which warlords are friendly because they have a history of changing sides.

Another factor is the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, commander of Joint Task Force 76 in Afghanistan, told ABC reporter Diane Sawyer that killing or capturing Osama bin Laden is important symbolically but it's more important to defeat his intentions, his network and his capability to inflict harm.

Indeed, Miniter said that some do not want bin Laden captured because those who harbor him "adore" him. His capture would precipitate uprisings.

Miniter outlined the complexity of that part of the world by saying that in May 1999, bin Laden was spotted by a UAV from 20,000 feet during a falcon contest in Afghanistan. (He explained that falconry is like golf in the United States.)

Why wasn't bin Laden killed? Because a high ranking government official from a "friendly" Muslim country was spotted with him with his own falcon. Miniter said that falconry is big business and a source of Taliban income, and proposed a novel solution: simply enforce migratory birds treaties.

The Pakistan border poses a problem reminiscent of the cross-border sanctuaries used by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. Miniter reported that U.S. forces suffer cross-border artillery and mortar attacks but may not return fire, even though the border doesn't even exist according to some countries involved. In addition, the Taliban will make cross-border assaults with 10-50 fighters, but the United States is not allowed to cross back.

We cannot afford to give the enemy sanctuaries, he said, so it's time to change the rules of engagement. If we let the present trends continue, we could lose.

Rodriguez, the Joint Task Force 76 commander, is confident, however, of an eventual win. For one thing, look at the numbers.

The Afghan National Army has 35,000 soldiers and 63,000 police. The army is expected to grow to 70,000 soldiers, and the police to 82,000 police. Meanwhile 47,000 friendly troops from outside the country, including 25,000 Americans, are fielding a powerful force.

According to the Taliban, the "new" Taliban force had 6,000 fighters and more than 1,000 suicide bombers poised for the spring attacks in Afghanistan, although Rodriguez would place the numbers at about half.

The spring attack kicked off in February -- not by the Taliban but by NATO forces aimed to knock the Taliban off balance. Although, as Mininter says, people in that part of Afghanistan and Pakistan leave their caves every spring to go out and fight somebody -- sort of like a bout of cabin fever. The U.S. and NATO forces offensive is one of the earliest of any year. This makes it difficult because spring runoffs cause mudslides and washed out roads, but it's succeeding.

Based upon reports of Taliban killed and captured, the enemy effectives must now be something far less than either the 6,000 number or Rodriguez' estimate of 3,000.

Nevertheless, the Taliban have created a force multiplier by capturing prisoners, as previously reported in this column. David Montero, writing in Christian Science Monitor, says the Taliban have learned the benefits of emotional warfare and made kidnappings their new "weapon of choice."

Last month, after the Taliban kidnapped Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo, Afghan president Hamid Karzai traded five Taliban prisoners for Mastrogiacomo's release to avoid the chance that Italy's parliament might opt to pull out its 1,950 troops.

Karzai refused to negotiate for Adjmal Naqshbandi, Mastrogiacomo's Afghan translator who also had been kidnapped. Then, depending on sources, Naqshbandi was either beheaded or had his throat slit April 8, enlarging a schism between Karzai and the Afghan public.

Subsequently, the Taliban have claimed they seized two French aid workers and 13 Afghans. Furthermore, they have threatened to kill four Afghan medical employees unless Karzai releases more Taliban prisoners.

So, no matter how many Taliban might be captured or killed, the Taliban leaders are using a powerful lever against international willpower.

Nevertheless, according to Rodriguez, the Taliban will not win in Afghanistan even though the terror group will continue to attack NATO, U.S. and Afghan government forces. "I think they see their opportunities starting to slip away," he said.

But, although we might win the conflict in Afghanistan, a bigger fish to fry will be Pakistan. And time could be running out if Gen. McCaffrey is right. Top | Home

The other VA

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs speaks of a VA often ignored by the press

by Fred Edwards

April 27, 2007 -- On April 19 in Alexandria, Va., Secretary of Veterans Affairs R. James Nicholson gave his views from the top to a gathering of the Military Officers Association of America. Coming on the heels of a seemingly unending litany of criticisms about the VA from various sources, the secretary's positive approach seemed like a tale of another VA and deserves to be reported.

Nicholson, who has been secretary 27 months, said we are the only nation that has a separate government department to care for veterans in three areas -- health, benefits and burial

The VA operates the largest integrated health care system in the United States and perhaps in the entire world, he said. "Very arguably it is the best." For example, last year Harvard University said the VA operates the best major medical system and the New York Times said it should be a model for all major medical systems.

In a "singularly significant accomplishment, 7.8 million patients are enrolled in the VA's electronic database. "It's fully portable," he said. If you are a veteran who is enrolled, you can go to a VA facility anywhere, give your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number, and you're in.

He said his agency is working closely to help the Department of Defense transition from paper records, and cited an example of two wounded Marines who arrived at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany from Iraq with medical records affixed to them with duct tape -- no DVD, no CD, nothing but paper.

During Hurricane Katrina the department evacuated "tens of thousands" of vets from the area, and did not lose one vet or one medical record, he emphasized. Meanwhile the civilian society lost over a million medical records.

The department currently sees more than 1 million patients each week, and expects to have an 87-billion dollar budget next year. He said that 99.5 percent of the time the department does well, but that leaves room for a few cases that create stories.

If he wasn't using 99.5 percent as a figure of speech, the remaining 0.5 percent of the 1 million patients the VA sees weekly would produce 5,000 problem cases a week. And of course those would be the source of the stories we hear about.

To change the perspective, a civilian hospital that sees 1,000 patients a week would have five patients with problems.

Turning to benefits, Nicholson said the department administers the GI Bill, sponsors the sixth largest life insurance company in the nation and operates a mortgage guarantee system.

He admitted that he could not brag about the benefit claims lags. "The (average) time to adjudicate claims of 177 days is too long." He wants to reduce it to 125 days, and, if he gets the budget he requested, the department will hire 450 new claims examiners.

On burials, Nicholson said the VA gives veterans the opportunity for a dignified place of final repose. He added that the department is undergoing the biggest expansionary action since the Civil War, with over 1,800 burials a day. The agency is aggressively trying to acquire land for cemeteries. "It's going very well," he said.

Returning to medical, the secretary said, "We can work much better in transition of injured service members from DoD to us, and quoted a senator: "Jim, we can track a package anywhere in the world so we ought to be able to track a human being."

On the plus side, the department will screen everybody returning from the combat zones for brain damage from explosions. It also is screening for PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) in order to show the veterans, their families and their employers that it is nothing more than a normal reaction to an abnormal experience they've just had.

"I don't know of anywhere where the environment was like this, with no safe haven anywhere 24/7. Even the mess halls are not safe because people are willing to blow themselves up in order to blow some of the Americans up."

"On TV they say they want to bring us down, and bring down our way of life. It escapes me how people cannot recognize the threat we have."

"The president said, our veterans are our finest citizens. I think they are our nations most important." So we at VA get to take care of our finest, most important people."

So concludes the tale of the "other" VA. Top | Home

The dog days of summer are coming early

by Fred Edwards

May 4, 2007 -- The dog days of summer normally run from July to early September, when lands abutting the Mediterranean burn their hottest and deadliest. They center upon the conjunction of Sirius (the dog star) and the sun. But for Americans the dog days of the long war are arriving now.

We hear that Navy Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command, doesn't want the term, "the long war," used any more within his command because it tells the Muslims we intend to stay in the Middle East for a long, long time.

But it is a long war, and we had better stay for a long, long time. If we pull out, here's what Oliver North, the host of "War Stories" on the FOX News Channel, says to expect.

* During the American retreat, Iranian-sponsored terrorists will unleash waves of suicide bombers to inflict disgrace and shame upon the United States.

* The Iraqi government will be replaced by regional governments as barbaric as the Taliban were in Afghanistan, re-enslaving women, and flooding refugees into the surrounding countries.

* The Kurds in northern Iraq could declare themselves autonomous, provoking Turkish, Iranian and Syrian military intervention.

* In order to cut and run, the United States would have to either destroy billions of dollars in American equipment or leave it behind. It also would sacrifice more than $40 billion of ongoing reconstruction projects.

* Kuwait, Jordan, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain might eject American military bases. This would severely obstruct the conduct of U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf as well as support of operations in Afghanistan.

* We could expect Islamic radicals to launch terror attacks world-wide against Americans and American interests.

If North is correct -- and he's not alone with his predictions -- we simply have no choice but to continue this tough struggle. And tough it will be. Here's why:

The all-volunteer force has reached a crunch point. Although the Army and Marines finally are getting a chance to increase their troop strength, it takes 10 years to grow middle-grade officers and enlisted members. So, to paraphrase former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, during the interim we'll have to use what we've got. That means that the Air Force and the Navy must continue to commit thousands of troops to help American soldiers' conduct their business in Iraq.

The Reserves and the National Guard troops are being deployed so much that in the mornings they don't know whether to put on a uniform or civilian clothes. Furthermore, Guard leaders have warned Congress that so much equipment is in Iraq that they might have difficulty with another Katrina-like operation.

The president is having difficulty governing because of a Democratic House and recalcitrant Senate.

And Bush's national security advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, is searching for a "war czar" for Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a person would brief the president every morning, and perhaps have the clout to bring a slew of agencies into line. The latter could help us turn the corner if it's not too late. And it's absolutely necessary.

For example, counterinsurgency expert David Galula explains in Counterinsurgency Warfare -- Theory and Practice that to defeat an insurgency (if we now can call it that), you must have a single boss over the military, police, judicial and political structure. Moreover, civilian tasks must be given to civilians and the civilian leader must command, because the effort is only 20 percent military while it's 80 percent political

And yes, expect it to be a long war. Fourth-generation war expert Thomas X. Hammes writes in The Sling and the Stone that the Chinese Communists fought for 28 years, the Vietnamese Communists 30 years, the Sandinistas 18 years, the Palestinians have resisted Israeli occupation for 29 years so far, and the Chechens have been fighting for more than 10 years -- this time. Al Qaeda has been fighting for their vision of the world for 20 years, since the founding of the Afghan Service Bureau in 1984.

And it will be tough. In Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence writes: "To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife."

But Americans have come through worse. George Washington's winter at Valley Forge from Dec. 19, 1777, to June 19, 1778, comes to mind, when he rebuilt a broken army that won the war. The dog days for Lincoln also come to mind, when he was surrounded by cabinet officers who were political rivals and had little interest in his road map to preserve the Union. Had he not persevered, there would be no United States of America as we know it today.

So we can get through the dog days. But will we? Top | Home

VA bonuses: What would you do?

by Fred Edwards

May 11, 2007 -- On April 27 I wrote a positive column about the Department of Veterans Affairs ("The other VA: The Secretary of Veterans Affairs speaks of a VA often ignored by the press") gleaned from VA Secretary R. James Nicholson. Soon afterwards came a blaring headline, "Veterans affairs under fire for hefty bonuses." Let's get out from under the headlines and see what this is all about.

First, it's clear that bonuses were awarded to the tune of $3.8 million in 2006. Government statistics show that the average bonus for VA employees in fiscal 2005 was $16,173, while the average for all agencies was $13,814. The awards ran as high as $33,000 each, an amount roughly equal to 20 percent of their annual salaries. And they appear to be disproportionately awarded to senior VA officials with high visibility in Washington.

It's also clear that bonuses went to a deputy assistant secretary and several regional directors who were involved with the VA's budget for 2005 -- the budget that was subsequently cited as containing misleading rationale that resulted in $1.3 billion in smoke-and-mirrors savings. Moreover, a bonus went to the deputy undersecretary for benefits, who is responsible for managing the disability claims system -- the system with a backlog of cases that averages 177 days in getting benefits to disabled veterans.

Finally, it's clear that these bonuses are recommended by division chiefs and approved by Secretary Nicholson himself. He has praised his workers as being conscientious and capable, and he certainly has backed up his praise with action.

Now if you had the authority to approve bonuses, what would you do? If the law allowed you to transfer funds in order to start reducing the claims adjudication length, you would have to decide which comes first -- retention of top-level employees to handle tomorrow's problems, or diversion of their bonuses to take care of today's veterans. If you weren't allowed to transfer the funds, would you simply refuse to approve the bonuses?

Democrat Rep. Harry Mitchell of Ariz., chairman of the House Veterans' Affairs subcommittee on oversight, calls it a "gross injustice," and that no government official should ever be rewarded for misleading taxpayers. He adds that the VA should not be handing out the most lucrative bonuses in government while veterans are waiting months and months to see a doctor.

On the Senate side, Daniel Akaka, Democrat from Hawaii who heads the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, sent a letter to Nicholson demanding he explain what the department plans to do to eliminate any bonuses based on favoritism.

Rep. Phil Hare, D-Ill., of the House committee, simpled called for Nicholson's resignation.

Now let's look at it from the point of view of the recipient. If you were a senior-level VA official who was given a bonus, what would you do?

If you were a medical center director and given a bonus of $19,000, would you accept it, perhaps because "everybody else does," or because it's quietly expected as part of your overall compensation?

Or if you were a director of veterans benefits administration and offered a $20,000 bonus, would you take it because you think you deserve it?

Or perhaps, if you are, say, a regional counsel who has been awarded a $22,380 bonus. Would you refuse it? If you weren't allowed to decline it, would you give $22,380 to a charity dedicated to helping veterans?

Although our disabled veterans need to know more about all these questions, most of all they need a plausible explanation from Secretary Nicholson. And they don't want to wait 177 days to get it.

It's time to find out what's behind the headlines. Top | Home

Crosshairs on trade-based money laundering

by Fred Edwards

May 18, 2007 -- The Islamic fascists have several sources for financing, and Americans could unwittingly be providing the funding.

I described the car bomb rings in my March 23 column, "How al Qaeda operations are killing our troops in Iraq." That operation was described by John. J. Loftus and Bill Warner in a keynote session of an intelligence summit conference earlier in March. Essentially, they said that stolen vehicles are being channeled to Muslim used car dealers in the United States, who are shipping them to Dubai's (United Arab Emirates) free trade zone for resale at inflated prices, with the cash proceeds earmarked to support terrorism.

In a recent note to Crosshairs, Warner, who has been investigating the used car scam for four years, added a new twist.

He explained that thousands of counterfeit CDs, DVDs and Microsoft Vista software programs are shipped from Egypt to the Port of Tampa every month. They are then retailed throughout the Tampa Bay area. For example, in February 2007, more than 150 shipments of the counterfeit merchandise were received at the port, resulting in over $1 million in sales, he said. He added that, if the cost of goods was $300,000, this brought a profit of $700,000.

This amount of money couldn't be placed in a bank and couldn't be transferred by wire without alerting the FBI. So what's an Islamic extremist to do? Buy cars.

So multiple associates in the used car business purchase $700,000 in vehicles from auto auctions, and deliver them to a central warehouse storage lot near the port, where they are shipped to Dubai in containers. In Dubai, which Warner says is the largest used car connection in the world, the vehicles can be resold for up to four times their retail value.

Warner explained that the $700,000 in profit that was re-invested to buy the vehicles in Tampa now becomes $2.8 million in Dubai. Deduct 20 percent for shipping, handling and ground transportation, and you have a net profit of $2.24 million from the initial $300,000 cost of goods. U.S. federal agencies can't follow the money because "there isn't any." The cars are the cash.

Warner said that Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Treasury Department "finally" are beginning to do something about the operation. Indeed it now has a name -- "trade-based money laundering."

In a Boston Globe article of May 3, David Lawder wrote that the U.S. Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security departments have announced a new strategy designed to combat trade-based money laundering. This developed from a threat assessment report of last year that concerned itself with all non-traditional money-laundering techniques.

The agencies are looking at the problem as a criminal investigation, which will cover additional avenues perhaps not connected with the Islamic extremists, such as currency exchanges, firms that redeem cash cards, activities in free-trade zones, and casino operations.

Authorities in other countries also are moving to thwart al Qaeda's worldwide fund-raising campaign.

For example, in London, on April 25, the Lancashire Telegraph reported that four men pleaded guilty to conspiring with Dhiren Barot, who was sentenced to life in prison in November for planning attacks on the New York Stock Exchange, London train stations and hotels. One of the men, Junade Feroz, was a car dealer at his brother's shop at Lower Audley Tyre Centre.

And on May 2, Montreal's Gazette reported that, in the Duvernay district of Laval, Quebec, Canadian police discovered a stolen car and car parts lot said to be the biggest ever uncovered in Canada. They estimated that the lot contained more than 700 fully assembled vehicles and another 200 with parts removed.

Warner says, "Every time there is a Muslim plot to blow up and kill U.S. or British targets there is a Muslim car dealer involved in financing the project."

And innocent Americans (as well as Brits and Canadians) could be unwittingly funding al Qaeda.

Bill Warner's Website is at www.wbipi.com.

Top | Home

Strategic repositioning in Iraq

by Fred Edwards

May 25, 2007 -- It will be no surprise if the United States begins repositioning forces in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East this fall. The time will be right, and our strategic interests will support it. Here are five reasons why.

1. We hear rumblings from various sectors of the Iraqi government that they want the United States to phase out U.S. ground combat troops as Iraqi forces continue to come on line.

2. More and more members of Congress appear willing to find a way forward without calling for a time-table that demands a cut-and-run stance. Very few lawmakers or speakers for any group are demanding a precipitous withdrawal from the area by calendar deadlines. Such a move would set the course toward catastrophe that I outlined in my May 4 column, "The dog days of summer are coming early." In fact, trying to move some 150,000 troops and their equipment completely out of the Middle East in six months -- or a year -- or even two years -- could turn into a rout that ultimately would create a hundredfold more terror directed against the United States than occurred on 9/11.

3. The president has indicated he is willing to set benchmarks to measure progress in Iraq, and on May 10 he announced that he had instructed Joshua B. Bolten, the White House chief of staff, to work with both sides of the aisle to that effect.

4. Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a news conference May 24 that a "transition" might be adopted after Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, reports to Washington in September on the status of the "surge.".

5. And all the commotion in Washington about benchmarks is reminding Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that American repositioning is on the horizon, ready or not.

The term, "repositioning," does not connote retreat, or even a relatively rapid withdrawal. Let's look at how Bing West describes it in the May 28 issue of National Review.

West, a former Marine and former assistant secretary of defense, says that, so long as security continues to improve, Iraqi units will take on the aggressive attitudes of their American partner units. As the American units move out of the direct combat role, they will be replaced by a "U.S. advisory corps," -- advisors that do not have American battalions in direct support.

He calls the advisers the "coaches" who will be in positions to see if their Iraqi units are succeeding. Such jobs will be the toughest yet faced by American service members in Iraq. The advisor leaders could be selected this summer, and by next year they will be the "glue" that maintains stability.

According to West, success at that point will not depend upon the Iraqi forces -- it will hinge upon whether the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are willing to offer their best talent to fill the advisor jobs.

If this all falls in place, the remaining steps of repositioning could follow those I outlined in my column of Oct. 27, 2006, "At the crossroads in Iraq -- Resetting the milestones."

1. The United States would be positioned to support Iraq with emergency military responses while maintaining a staging area in the Middle East. From there U.S. troops and firepower could counter regional threats of Islamic fascist movements and rogue governments such as Iran.

2. This repositioning would support a primary, originally unspoken, purpose of the original American invasion of Iraq -- to establish a U.S. military presence in the heart of the Middle East as a springboard from which to counter threats against American security.

Such a move will further U.S. interests with no disgrace and no retreat. Furthermore, it will not dishonor the Americans and other members of the coalition who have died. Indeed, it will reinforce their sacrifices, because it will give the Iraqis the opportunity to complete their chance for freedom while affording the United States forward bases to provide stability in the region.

Top | Home

Refocusing the National Guard

by Fred Edwards

June 1, 2007 -- If the National Guard is not broken by its employment in Iraq, it's certainly badly bent. How did we get here and what can we do about it?

The Guard, which celebrated its 370th birthday on Dec. 13, 2006, traces its history back to the earliest English colonies in North America. Responsible for their own defense, the colonists drew on English military tradition and organized their able-bodied male citizens into militias. The colonial militias protected their fellow citizens from Indian attacks and foreign invaders, and later helped win the Revolutionary War.

Throughout the 19th century, the size of the regular army was small. So America counted on the militia to provide the bulk of the troops during the Mexican War, the early months of the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. Legislation in 1903 and 1916 renamed the militia the National Guard, gave it an official role as a reserve for the Army, and authorized federal funding for training and equipment.

In 1916, most of the Guard units were mobilized for service in the Mexican border campaign. As in the earlier wars, in many cases this stripped the states of their own defense.

But the Mexican campaign was just a preview. When the United States entered World War I on Jan. 22, 1917, every Guard unit was activated, contributing 40 percent of the U.S. combat divisions in France.

Today. more than 25,000 Guard troops are deployed in Iraq, with more in the surge pipeline. Almost 5,000 are serving in Afghanistan, and some 6,000 are once again perched along the Mexican border. Because of this commitment, reports consistently indicate that stateside Guard units can field only 40 percent of the equipment they need for disaster response, and that nearly 90 percent of them are rated less than fully ready because of equipment and training shortages. Congress can provide funding to correct the equipment problem, but that won't solve the personnel problem.

So this poses the question of what states will do if America is hit by another Katrina -- or by an Islamic fascist weapon of mass destruction.

We've already seen that available Guard units from other states can be shifted, and regular troops can be assigned to assist. But governors are essentially naked without their own militias.

Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, and a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, writes in the New York Times that each state should have a nondeployable home guard. Volunteers for these units would include "doctors, nurses, construction workers, firefighters, police officers, communications experts, city planners, engineers and social workers."

He says that the home guards should be funded through the Department of Homeland Security by at least $10 billion, which he explains is "the cost of one month's operations in Iraq."

On the other hand, Brent C. Bankus, writing in Joint Forces Quarterly, says these "State Defense Forces" should be partially funded through the National Guard Bureau. The NGB also could establish "an active authoritative command and control headquarters." He adds that they should be federally recognized in order to give them access to basic equipment and nonresident military courses.

The framework for such forces already exists. Volunteer organizations of various types and sizes are on the rolls in 23 states and Puerto Rico. Some are budgeted by the state and some are unbudgeted. The members earn no pay or allowances, although, if called to active duty by their governors, they will receive pay that varies by state.

If these home guard, or state defense, units are to be organized with federal recognition and assistance, the operative word is "nondeployable," lest the governors lose control over them at the outset.

So that's where we are, and that's how we can fix this problem.

Top | Home

Alternative fuel -- Air Force leads the way

But it can't be the leader

by Fred Edwards

June 8, 2007 -- The Air Force is the U.S. government's biggest consumer of jet fuel. And it's expensive, with an annual fuel consumption bill that has gone from $2.8 billion in 2004 to $6.2 billion. Furthermore, each $10 increase in the price of a barrel of oil costs the Air Force an additional $600 million in fuel consumption, according to Air Force Materiel Command officials.

Although it's expensive for the Air Force to fly, the force has no choice because it simply MUST fly to fulfill it's part of the overall national security mission. Thus it must do something about its dependence upon fuel -- and it's not dallying around. It has launched an aggressive plan to convert to alternative fuels, and has already conducted a 6.1-hour flight test of a B- 52H bomber burning a synthetic fuel mix in all eight of its engines.

Not only was the test a stunning success, but also it treated the engines as well or better than the traditional, crude-oil based JP-8 aviation fuel. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley, who has seen the B-52 engines running on the synthetic fuel (synfuel), said the synfuel burns clean. He said that, after an engine has been running on synthetic fuel, if you break the engine down, the inside "looks like it's chromed." It looks like you've taken all the parts out and run them through a plating process and chromed them, he added.

The Air Force's synfuel, called Fischer Tropsch fuel after the Fischer-Tropsch process used to produce it, can be made from coal, shale, natural gas, plant matter or other crude oil substitutes. The procedure involves high carbon dioxide-emitting coal-to-liquid (CTL) fuel refining.

CTL fuels are controversial because some environmentalists say CTL refineries have higher carbon dioxide emissions than conventional refineries. While many CTL industry officials say they can capture and sequester CO2, some believe the sequestration might increase the cost of the fuel as well as raise other costs imposed by eventual CO2 regulation.

On the other side of the CTL issue, Gen. Moseley says a cubic measure of CO2 is worth more on total than a cubic measure of natural gas, because in the petroleum industry you can place C02 into deep wells in order to extract oil from the bottom.

The Air Force's move into alternative fuels is not necessarily unique, says Moseley, citing South Africa as an example. That country was forced to convert to synthetic fuel when it was embargoed and couldn't import traditional jet fuel.

By 2016, the Air Force hopes to have converted half of its aviation fuel to the 50-50 synthetic blend. At the existing consumption rate, this would mean acquiring 325 million gallons of a 50/50 blend of synfuel and JP-8.

Nevertheless, the Defense Department doesn't want to become the sole user or even the major user of synthetic fuels. DOD research director John Young explains that the department can't afford to create a dependent market. "we're just not going to drive the market where the nation consumes 21 million barrels [of oil] a day. We can help jump-start companies but at the end of the day [DOD's daily consumption of] 340,000 barrels can't drive the marketplace."

Accordingly, on March 8, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne told the Air Force Energy Forum in Arlington, VA, that the service "will need support from the airlines" to increase the demand for synfuel in the United States. "The buying power of the airlines, which constitutes approximately 85 percent of the market, will be important for the Air Force and the synfuel industry," he said.

However, it doesn't seem likely that price-sensitive airlines would voluntarily pay more for CTL and other synfuels than market prices for conventional fuels. Why might market prices be lower? OPEC could manipulate oil production costs to keep the market price of petroleum below that of CTL fuel prices.

This concept thus becomes another ball for the OPEC countries to juggle. But it also can be a juggling act over which OPEC historically has not always had complete control.

Look at the OPEC countries: Algeria, Angola, Iraq, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.

Then look at the top ten exporting countries of crude oil to the United States. According to the Department of Energy, 98 percent of all U.S. crude oil imports in March 2007 were, in order, from Canada, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Angola, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait and Brazil.

The top five accounted for 67 percent. The top two -- non-OPEC countries Canada and Mexico -- exported almost 3 million barrels per day out of the 6.5 million imported by all five. Although this is comparing apples and oranges, it's interesting to think of converting Canada and Mexico's 3 million barrels to 6 million by converting to synfuel. This would leave the United States independent of OPEC for almost 67 percent of its oil consumption.

There's no question about it, the Air Force is leading the way, but it can't be the leader. The airlines and American industry must get onboard, and they might need a nudge via government tax policy. Top | Home

Pace becomes political pawn

What will the Senate do now?

by Fred Edwards

June 15, 2007 -- It has been said that the U.S. Senate consists of 100 men and women with 100 different opinions. In deference to some of those opinions, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced June 8 that he will recommend that President Bush nominate Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael G. Mullen to replace Marine Gen. Peter Pace as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Pace's term ends Sept. 30. This poses a question of how the Senate will view Adm. Mullen's nomination.

In the case of Gen. Pace, Secretary Gates said: "Because General Pace has served as chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the last six years, the focus of his confirmation process would have been on the past rather than the future." He said the confirmation process could possibly be quite contentious. A staffer used the word, "nasty," because the hearings would give Senators the chance to drag Pace through a mucky review of everything they think the administration has done wrong since Sept. 11, 2001. Pace would be the catalyst for contention because of his direct involvement with war planning and policy since shortly after the terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, Navy Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., the current vice chairman, who also was expected to be re-nominated, announced his decision to retire last week. Adm. Giambastiani represents the latest of the senior leadership to go, beginning with former Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Gates said he would recommend Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, for vice chairman. Cartwright is the commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

Pace has been criticized for not standing up to Rumsfeld. In addition, if the hearings turned nasty, also at issue would be Pace's recent comments about the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, in which he said homosexuality was immoral.

"I am no stranger to contentious confirmations, and I do not shrink from them," Gates said. "However, I have decided at this moment in our history, the nation, our men and women in uniform, and General Pace himself would not be well-served by a divisive ordeal in selecting the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

So Gen. Pace has to go as a political pawn, even though associates said he was deeply disappointed. Pace, the first Marine to serve as chairman, will remain in the position until his term ends Sept. 30. This means he will have served the shortest time as chairman since Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor's term ended in 1964. Significantly, had he been re-nominated, the confirmation hearing would have come in September, when the two top American ground commanders in Iraq are due to present their evaluation of the results of President Bush's surge strategy.

How does this affect Pace? On June 14 at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va., he was asked about it. National Review Online reports that he said it was discussed whether he should voluntarily retire and take the issue off the table. He told the students he could not because he didn't want even one private first class in Baghdad to ever think that his chairman could have stayed in the battle but voluntarily walked off the battlefield. So he refused to request retirement before Gates announced that he would not be renominated.

He concluded that some 40 years ago "I left some guys on the battlefield in Vietnam who lost their lives following 2nd Lt. Pace. And I promised myself then that I will serve this country until I was no longer needed. I need to be told that I'm done. I've been told I'm done."

But what of Adm. Mullen? As Chief of Naval Operations, he has proven to be brilliantly innovative. He has insisted on his Sailors deploying as "individual augmentees" to assist the Army's ground troops in the battle zones. And he has launched a vision of a "1,000-ship navy," consisting of ships from many nations with like-minded concerns about international terrorism and freedom of the seas.

When it's time for Mullen's confirmation hearings, how many of the 100 astute ladies and gentlemen of the Senate will see Mullen as another administration man, and go for the jugular in order to pillory the administration, the president--and the nominee? How many will assuage their embarrassment for what they've done to a patriot and cry, "Enough already, let's confirm him."? And how many will simply judge the nominee's qualifications? Top | Home

It's time to cure the VA disability rating system

A committee of top medical experts reports ailments and cures

by Fred Edwards

June 22, 2007 -- Comments that veterans have made for years about the Department of Veterans Affairs disability system have been reinforced in a study by the Institute of Medicine, released by the National Academies June 7, 2007.

The study, prepared by the Committee on Medical Evaluation of Veterans for Disability Compensation, concludes that the VA needs to overhaul its disability rating schedule. The following are the ailments to the present system and their cures.

The Overall Ailment: Committee chairman, Lonnie R. Bristow, former president of the American Medical Association, said, ". . . the Rating Schedule is out of sync with modern medicine and modern concepts of disability."

The Overall Cure: Bring it up to date and keep it up to date.

Ailment: Conditions listed in the rating schedule have not been reviewed for ten years.

Cure: Conduct a comprehensive revision every ten years. Remove ambiguous criteria and obsolete conditions and introduce current medical knowledge of the effects of injuries and diseases such as traumatic brain injury, diabetes, and hearing loss.

Ailment: Outdated diagnostic codes (codes used to identify disabilities). For example the code for post-traumatic stress disorder is still referred to by the World War II term, "gross stress reaction."

Cure: Adopt new diagnostic codes based on the International Classification of Diseases codes and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in order to keep up with advances in medical understanding.

Ailment: Disabilities are misaligned with loss of potential income.

Cure: Regularly adjust the rating schedule so that it accurately predicts loss of potential earnings. Ensure that average earnings at each rating level are the same for all disabling conditions.

Ailment: Disabilities currently are based only on assumed loss of income.

Cure: Work disability alone is too restrictive. Disabled veterans who can work often find their disabilities affecting other aspects of their lives, such as maintenance of their family and other personal relationships, or engagement in sports, hobbies, or other activities they might pursue if not disabled.

This reminds me of a colleague who has a knee disability who told a counselor he was unable to play golf. The counselor replied that it had no bearing on his ability to earn a living, and could prejudice his claim because golf can be an expensive hobby. He rolled his eyes when my colleague tried to explain that, if he could play golf, perhaps he could become a pro for a living. Thus the question is whether America owes that veteran recompense because he cannot seek to become a pro at golf, or tennis, pool, horseshoes or anything else he might have aspired to before he was disabled by military service.

Ailment: The disability schedule does not compensate for specific non-economic effects and loss of quality of life caused by disabilities.

Cure: If the new schedule doesn't compensate for such negative consequences, it either should be fixed or a separate schedule should be developed.

Ailment: The staff members who would update the rating schedule are not medical experts.

Cure: Make additional staff and resources available to update the rating schedule and implement other recommendations. Use guidance from an external advisory committee of medical professionals as well as vocational experts and representatives of the veteran community.

Ailment: Most raters do not have medical backgrounds, and they have no medical experts on staff to consult on complex cases.

Cure: Ensure that VA employees who rate veterans' disabilities have ready access to health care professionals who can provide guidance on medical and psychological issues that may only become apparent during the rating process.

Ailment: Evaluations for disabilities are uncoordinated.

Cure. VA and the U.S. Department of Defense should give veterans applying for disability compensation a thorough evaluation of all their medical, psychosocial, and vocational abilities and needs at the time they separate from service,

Ailment: Veterans must establish their disability before being eligible for disability benefits such as job training. This can take months or even years.

Cure: Stop requiring veterans to wait for disability findings before providing them additional benefits that would help them achieve their full potential in civilian life.

The medical experts have outlined the ailments and prescribed the cures. Now it's up to the Congress and the VA to commence treatment. Top | Home

What Richard Lugar really said

And what he really wants

by Fred Edwards

June 29, 2007 -- Senator Richard Lugar did not say on June 25 that it was time to cut and run from Iraq. In fact, the Republican from Indiana did not even suggest a total phased withdrawal. He advised the president to consider a strategic repositioning, similar to that which I discussed in my column of May 25. His "rational course adjustment" would take place in tandem with diplomatic and economic options. He said it should start soon, based on the following four primary objectives:

"First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq or any piece of its territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass destruction."

"Second, we have an interest in preventing the disorder and sectarian violence in Iraq from upsetting wider regional stability." The overarching goal, he said, is to prevent a regional war that would become a Middle Eastern version of a domino theory that would topple friendly governments, balloon an unsustainable refugee population, block the Persian Gulf, and destroy oil production facilities.

"Third, we have an interest in preventing Iranian domination of the region." The containment of Iran is paramount in order to prevent disruption of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, and ensure Israel's future.

"Fourth, we have an interest in limiting the loss of U.S. credibility in the region and throughout the world as a result of our Iraq mission." Lugar says that, although the United States already has lost some credibility, a re-evaluation of American strategic thrust, as he recommends, can salvage the loss "for a generation."

He rejected the current surge strategy, but also nixed the idea of total withdrawal. "Those who offer constructive criticism of the surge strategy are not defeatists, any more than those who warn against a precipitous withdrawal are militarists," he said. Continuing, he stated that to cut and run would batter U.S. credibility so badly that nations in the region could not be expected to cooperate on shared interests. He pointed out other disastrous results that total withdrawal would precipitate, which have been covered previously in this column: possible Turkish-Kurdish conflict, abandonment of huge economic and development projects, desertion of Iraqis who have aligned themselves with the United States, and exposure of Iraq to the possibility of becoming a full-fledged terrorist base.

To Implement his four basic objectives, Lugar would downsize and re-deploy U.S. troops to defensible locations outside of urban areas in Iraq, perhaps in the Kurdish territories, or elsewhere in the Middle East. He warned that "the longer we delay the planning for a re-deployment, the less likely it is to be successful." Note that he spoke of planning, not precipitous movement.

Estimates vary as to how much longer the military services can absorb today's deployment tempo within Iraq. I say "services," because both the Navy and the Air Force are augmenting ground troops in Iraq in addition to fulfilling their own roles in support of ground operations. This is happening even while the Air Force is severely downsizing. Add to the cloudy picture the end-strength increases the Army and Marine Corps are facing. They were given the increases, now they have to find the recruits.

Altogether, it is becoming obvious that the United States cannot remain in Iraq with a surged force, or for very much longer with the pre-surge strength. But they can start to reposition as the Iraqi military and security forces shape up.

Senator Lugar has laid a pretty good hand of cards on the table. His four objectives are beginning to look like four aces. Can anybody beat them? Top | Home

Al Qaeda leadership is being decentralized

But its operations continue

by Fred Edwards

July 6, 2007 -- Al Qaeda has hit the news because of the failed car bomb attacks by seven male doctors and a female medical technician in London and at Glasgow International Airport. We can expect more attempts -- and unfortunately some successes -- because al Qaeda's top leadership counts on ideology to drive leaders of decentralized operations.

Canon Andrew White, a senior priest working in Baghdad, reported to authorities in April about a conversation with an al Qaeda leader from Syria. The official had told him the organization had targeted England and America for murders, and warned, "those who cure you will kill you."

Because the warning did not come from Osama bin Laden or his number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, it is possible that the top leadership has been decentralized. Here's why.

In a terrorism intelligence report of June 27, Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com (Stratfor) said that the top levels are feeling the pressure from American and allied efforts along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Stratfor explained that al Qaeda's publicity arm, As-Sahab, aired a statement by al-Zawahiri to jihadist Internet forums June 25, and suggests that they chose this forum instead of the usual eye-catching video format because they had to. Why? Because they may be more at bay in the border region than some reports indicate.

Granted, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have escaped U.S.-led efforts to locate them, but growing numbers of their key subordinates have been eliminated. Thus, the quality of their replacements is subject to review. Stratfor says, "Publicly, al Qaeda has appointed Azzam the American as a major spokesman. If the prime node has been forced to promote others of his caliber to operational leadership positions, the group could be in big trouble."

Stratfor reminded readers that the top level of al Qaeda has not launched another 9/11-type operation. Nevertheless -- excluding Iraq and Afghanistan -- the lower leadership levels have been active. And as the level lowers, the attacks become more grass roots--such as those in London and Glasgow.

Stratfor explains that the cracks in senior command and control first surfaced in a July 2005 letter from al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi -- then chief of al Qaeda in Iraq -- seeking funding. Stratfor made an analysis of message traffic, and concluded that messages from al Qaeda's two top leaders have significantly shifted from video to audio, indicating concern for operational security. Bin Laden himself has not been heard from at all since July 1, 2006 -- more than a year. Reports indicate that he is alive, so it seems he must be concerned for security.

So it seems that al Qaeda leaders along the Afghan-Pakistani border do not feel safe enough to be operating with impunity. Stratfor ticks off the reasons why:

* June 19, 2007. An explosion kills 32 or more militants in Pakistan's Datta Khel district.

* May 2007. Mullah Dadullah, a key al Qaeda military leader, is killed in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

* Jan. 16, 2007. Pakistani aviation units kill 25 to 30 militants near Zamzola in Pakistan's South Waziristan.

* Oct. 30, 2006. A missile kills at least 80 people in Chingai, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. Sources say al-Zawahiri was the target.

* Jan. 13, 2006. A hellfire kills 18 people, including four senior al Qaeda operatives, in Damadola, Pakistan. The attack's intended target, al Zawahiri, is not present.

* Dec. 4, 2005. Pakistani authorities say Hamza Rabia, reportedly al Qaeda's director of operations, is killed by a hellfire missile in Haisori, North Waziristan.

* May 7, 2005. Haitham al-Yemeni, an al Qaeda operative who reportedly replaced Abu Farj al-Libi in al Qaeda's hie